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Abstract
Modiﬁcations and new approaches for breach response and forensic investigations
for compliance with the General Data Protection Regulation, GDPR, is to be ex-
pected in May 2018. This paper brings forth the conclusion that engagement from
top management is crucial in order to comply with the GDPR requirements. The
importance of having a vision and a strategy assessing the matters of breach re-
sponse, so that resources can enable procedures for an investigation, is articulated.
To enable appropriate countermeasures, a clear understanding of the regulation is
essential and presented in terms of severity of risk to the rights and freedoms of an
individual. Including required actions to take upon a breach and the time-frame
of each obligation. Furthermore, the report discusses an approach to approximate
the number of individuals being aﬀected by a breach, through looking at the in-
trusion point. This is an essential step since every incident report that needs to
be communicated to Datainspektionen needs to assess the approximate number
of individuals aﬀected. Assessing the eﬀects of an incident through the intrusion
point-approach, is an initial step before the forensic analyst may deﬁne the exact
number of aﬀected individuals.
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0.2 List of acronyms
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0.3 Deﬁnitions
Breach notiﬁcation The conducted procedure of notifying a party of
a breach
Breach response The procedures of actions to take upon a breach
to mitigate the damage caused and reduce the
risk of unauthorized data access.
Consent The permission given by an individual for its data
to be stored
Containment Narrowing down the scope of a breach and mini-
mizing the eﬀect on neighboring systems
Compromised data Data that has been exposed, altered or liable to
danger
Data subject The individual who is the subject of personal data
Data object The records linked to the data subject
Intrusion point The part of a system where an attack is initiated
Recitals Causes/reasons that the articles in GDPR are
built upon
State of the art Highest level of general development.
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Chapter1
Introduction
The new European General Data Protection Regulation, GDPR, is coming into
eﬀect in May 2018. At the time of writing (January 2018), the eﬀect on corpo-
rate organizations and companies is substantial and should be carefully assessed
as to not create unwanted implications. The regulation restricts companies and
organizations from collecting more data than what is relevant in relation to the
purposes for which they are processed. All data containing personal information
about an individual, here to be called data subject, will require said individuals’
consent. The rights and freedoms of the data subject are to be protected, but the
implications for entities processing personal data shall not be neglected [1]. Strict
requirements on actions to be taken upon a personal data breach are stated in
GDPR, covering notiﬁcation to national supervisory authority as well as to the in-
dividuals aﬀected by the breach. The denominator of GDPR, forensics and breach
response is the Personal Identiﬁable Information, PII. PII is the core of GDPR,
and breach response, with forensics as a tool, is the procedure of assessing which
PII that have been aﬀected by a potential breach. This thesis will investigate
the adoption of new and altered obligations in incident response and establish
guidance in accordance with GDPR on how to conduct the procedures for breach
notiﬁcation.
1.1 Background and motivation
Data breaches are becoming part of our daily lives. Companies more frequently
than ever before are admitting to having breaches in their systems. GDPR is a
regulation that brings light to the matter in various ways through forcing aﬀected
companies to go public with their issues and act upon it. A data breach may
result in millions of private personal records and sensitive data being exposed.
Compromised data is a subject that now has caught the public’s attention, leading
to the question, is GDPR here to make companies pay for their mistakes?
In 2012 the European Commission proposed a comprehensive reform of data
protecting rules in the EU. In 2016, GDPR was accepted with the objective to
give citizens back control over their data. GDPR declares how organizations,
authorities and other entities are allowed to collect and use personal data within
the EU [2]. This enforces every data collecting entity to go over their current
IT security and likely adopt changes. GDPR is expected to have a large impact
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on the way organizations handle data containing personal information. Prior to
GDPR, there was little to no legal framework that provided requirements on how
to handle data concerning individual’s personal information with as much care.
Hence, the GDPR areas that so far have been in the spotlight are the requirements
to enable the possibility of data erasure, data portability, and consent, as opposed
to breach response that very recently has raised concerns. Breach response covers
the actions to take upon a breach, including notifying data subjects and reporting
to supervisory authority. Examples of areas that need to be investigated before
an organization will know how to take the correct measurements are, when breach
reporting needs to be done, what information that needs to be reported and to
whom, how to obtain the information to report and how to get the e-evidence to
prove that the report is truthful. In order to be compliant with the new regulation,
these steps towards a breach response plan are essential. It includes being able to
distinguish whether a personal data breach has taken place, followed by taking the
subsequent steps to avoid the sanctions that may be applicable if failure to follow
the requirements take place.
To conclude, GDPR puts Personal Identiﬁable Information, PII, in focus,
which, while exposed, executes the breach response plan which needs to be es-
tablished and accurate.
1.2 Purpose
To enhance the knowledge in the ﬁeld, this thesis goal is to examine breach response
in order to be compliant with GDPR, and what preventive measures that need to
be in place. The chosen topic is found to bring value due to the still unexplored area
and to be of relevance for all organizations aﬀected by the GDPR, all organizations
processing personal identiﬁable information.
1.3 Problem statement
The main problem this thesis will investigate is how forensic methods and preven-
tive measures must be adopted to handle the new requirements of breach response
in GDPR. This problem statement is broken down into three subareas:
1. Clariﬁcation of the regulation - What needs to be reported and to
whom?
2. Forensic investigation - How to obtain the requested information to be
reported. E.g. how to narrow down the scope of a breach to not assume all
subjects in a database have leaked.
3. Incident management - Investigate methods and processes of incident
management in order to provide best possible environment for forensic anal-
yses.
These three subareas will be discussed in the above-mentioned order. In the
conclusion presented in Chapter 7, recommended approaches to all three subtopics
will be presented.
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1.4 Limitations
This section presents the limitations of scope taken and the present state of GDPR.
The national supervisory authority, that has the power to adopt the regulation
in Sweden, is Datainspektionen. An investigation of how the regulation shall be
adopted in Sweden is currently in progress. SOU 2017:39 is the complementary
regulation from May 2017 that has been under submission of comment and was
presented in December 2017, together with the legislative proposal [3]. Data Pro-
tection Working Party 29 has published their guidelines on Personal data breach
notiﬁcation, adopted on October 3. No further guidance has been published at
this stage. This is of relevance since the regulation is not yet in action and might
likely be provided with further guidelines from Datainspektionen and the national
government on certain paragraphs which today are vague to the reader.
Within GDPR, limitations have been made to not go into detail on the entire
procedure of incident management. The scope has been narrowed down to the
preventive measures and guidance of breach response, including aspects of forensic
analyses. Primarily the Articles 33-35 of GDPR, covering breach response, will
be examined. However, this thesis will not conﬂict nor ignore the rest of the
regulation.
Limitations have also been made to not examine how to evaluate the degree
of risk of a breach. Weather it is an immediate risk, high risk, risk or no risk, to
the rights and freedoms of a natural person.
Security software such as Intrusion Detection Systems, IDS, Intrusion Pre-
vention Systems, IPS, and Security Information and Event Management software,
SIEM, will not be evaluated, but are considered to be of interest and relevant to
detecting malicious activity and supporting incident response eﬀorts.
1.5 Outline
A concise account of Methods is conducted in Chapter 2, where chosen approaches
adopted for this thesis are presented and explained. This chapter also presents the
two sections of collections, (1) Literature study and (2) Data collection, that will
be assessed in Chapter 3 and 4, respectively. Chapter 3 presents relevant theory
and concepts, covering the regulation GDPR itself together with other regulations
that we may learn from, as well as deﬁnitions of certain concepts of importance.
The theory is followed by the empirics in Chapter 4, which covers the performed
interviews and observations leading on to the Result in Chapter 5. Chapter 5
merge the empirics with the theory and allows for a conclusion based on both
facts and observations responding to the three subareas that are presented in the
Problem Statement. The results will be discussed in Chapter 6, Discussion, and
the thesis is ﬁnally concluded in Chapter 7, Conclusion. Appendix A contains
several deﬁnitions of GDPR-concepts, taken from the GDPR Article 4. Article
33 and Article 34 can be found in Appendix B and C, respectively. Recital 86
of the GDPR is in Appendix D, and ﬁnally, questions for qualitative interview in
Appendix E.
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Approach and Methodology
In order to gain a suﬃcient foundation to draw conclusions from, a good under-
standing of how incident management and breach response is being performed
today, and what changes in that speciﬁc scope that needs to be altered to comply
with GDPR, is necessary. For this, a qualitative and iterative research approach
has been adopted. This approach is considered suitable for investigating the impact
of this new regulation due to the incomplete adaption to Swedish law. This en-
ables room for change of interpretation of the articles of GDPR which lays ground
for the need of a ﬂexible approach. This chapter presents the chosen methods and
why they were implemented. The ﬁrst two sections cover the decision of qual-
itative and iterative research, the deﬁnitions and how they are adopted in this
thesis. The following three sections cover the literature study and collection of
data. The Literature study is presented in Chapter 3, Theory, and Chapter 4 is
the operational collection of data through interviews and observations.
2.1 Research strategy
This section introduces the reasons for the chosen qualitative research, as opposed
to a quantitative one. Both will be outlined and explained. This section will also
present the iterative approach used in addition to the qualitative research.
The fundamentals of a qualitative research are to gain an understanding of
underlying reasons, opinions and motivations, in this thesis, in regards to breach
response. This has been relevant due to the initial uncertainty of how these ques-
tions have been approached before. The qualitative approach is an exploratory
way of research that provide insights into problems through techniques such as
unstructured and semi-structured data collection. The research usually involves
groups of small sizes and could be focus groups, individual interviews or observa-
tions [4].A Quantitative research would, on the other hand, bring forth statistical
results and other means of quantiﬁcation. This would be hard to adopt to this
speciﬁc thesis due to the inﬂexible result. Quantitative research often uses large
samples and numerical statistics. It would not be possible to obtain as much
valuable information from a survey generating numerical values as from the open-
ended discussions taken in the qualitative research. The qualitative research has
therefore been chosen to give a ﬂexible approach using open-ended questions and
discussions.
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The chosen iterative approach consist of three primary parts, (1) the literature
research where the legal parts of GDPR and other regulations and standards will be
examined, (2) observations and interviews to get a rich and holistic understanding
of today’s situation, and (3) analysis and revision, to then restart again. Prior
to the iterations, a background research was performed followed by deﬁning an
initial hypothesis, as shown in Figure 1. Finalizing all iterations, the approach
closes with a narrowed down hypothesis and a ﬁnal conclusion.
Figure 1 Iterative process of the adopted research method.
Existing assumptions on GDPR-interpretations and breach response, gained
from the early literature research and in interviews, were explored and discussed.
At the analysis and revision stage, the focus gradually shifted from the initial ap-
proach of investigating optimal forensic methods, to tracing the problem up to the
steering-committee. This, through the obtained understanding of the importance
and impact of enclosing processes and methods. From the new knowledge and
guiding values, processes such as steering documents and disaster recovery plans
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were looked into. After each iteration of new insights and revised assumptions,
the hypotheses could be revised and ﬁnally be broken down into the three main
questions that earlier were presented in the Problem Statement as the narrowed
down hypothesis.
2.2 Literature study
The examined literature has been laws, legal documentation/regulations, stan-
dards and guidelines. These papers, given out by well-known global organizations
and institutes, are considered to be well-established sources of information. Ac-
curate guidance in both GDPR and incident management is of great importance.
Guidance has therefore been emphasized through the chosen literature.
Initially, relevant parts of the GDPR have been read together with associated
recitals followed by the Swedish interpretation of the regulation. Datainspektionen
continuously produces material and guidance for facilitating the compliance with
GDPR for organizations and shares their understanding on the Swedish adaption.
Therefore it has been necessary to be up to date with the new papers that have
been given out throughout the entire process of writing. Article 29 Working party,
WP29, is an independent European advisory body on data protection and privacy
that has conducted papers on their understanding of the regulation. WP29 has
been used in this paper as a great source for accurate interpretation on several
articles of the regulation.
Furthermore, additional regulations covering breach response have been exam-
ined, such as the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard, PCI DSS [5].
PCI DSS already has requirements for log management and methods for analyzing
an intrusion, which goes much deeper than the guidance of GDPR. Unlike GDPR,
the PCI is not focusing on personal data, but rather on card data, which will be
looked into to see if the same procedures will be possible to adapt. PCI DSS is
a good starting point since it is an in-depth and well established standard with
similar principles.
Finally, organizations such as NIST, ISO and OWASP have several relevant
papers on guidance and state of the art procedures within incident management
that have brought great value to this paper.
2.3 Collection of data
Empiric studies have been conducted through several qualitative interviews at
Knowit together with one deeper semistructured interview at a client of Knowit,
ﬁnalizing with a forensic investigation. Below, the two types of interviews will be
examined together with the reasons and deﬁnitions of the chosen types, as well
as the forensic investigation. The ﬁnal collection of the data is presented in the
Empirics in Chapter 4.
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2.3.1 Interviews at Knowit
As this master thesis is conducted at the consulting-ﬁrm Knowit Secure, nine
interviewees have been consultants of the ﬁrm. Knowit Secure is a leading security
ﬁrm in the Nordics and known for its both broad and deep competence with over
15 years in the ﬁeld for the majority of the consultants. Two interviews at the
connected ﬁrm Knowit Digital Law have also been conducted for the legal aspects
of GDPR. The goal of these interviews was to (1) Get an understanding of the
current situation in the ﬁeld (2) Get input and their understanding of the problem
statement (3) Get a correct understanding of GDPR. The following categories of
employees have been interviewed;
• Knowit Secure
3 Senior Management consultants
2 Security consultants
1 Penetration tester
1 Information security expert
1 Security specialist
1 Top management
• Knowit Digital Law
1 Digital law consultant
1 Top management
The interviews have been in the shape of both informal and unstructured inter-
views. Depending on the employee’s position, role, and background, a particular
query strategy has been used in combination with an open discussion. The beneﬁt
of informal interviews is that the respondent may just see it as conversation and
may, therefore, foster low-pressure interactions and speak more freely, which helps
to gain a good understanding of the area. Unstructured interviews tend on the
other hand to still be open-ended but express a little more control. There is a clear
plan regarding the focus and goal of the interview which guides the discussion [6].
The time for each interview has ranged from 30 min up to 3 hours, depending on
relevance. A disadvantage with open interviews is that it’s hard to make statistical
conclusions and graphs from the result. Since those types of result not would bring
much value to this speciﬁc thesis, they have not been applied.
2.3.2 Interview at ﬁntech company
Two sessions of semistructured meetings took place at a client to Knowit. The in-
terview/observation was conducted with the Chief Information Security Oﬃcer at
a ﬁntech company. Semistructured is a common type of interview within a qualita-
tive research approach. The interview is open, based on a framework of themes to
be explored allowing new ideas to be brought up as a result of ﬁnding new interest-
ing paths. The interview gave a complementary veriﬁcation of a typical situation
of an organization’s information security measures. Questions discussed can be
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found in Appendix E. The second phase was partaking in a meeting discussing
compliance and creation of Business Continuity Plan, BCP, for the company. A
general knowledge of how diﬀerent security procedures work, was gained.
2.3.3 Forensic observation
To get a better understanding of how a forensic investigation works, a case of an
incident at a client got analyzed and investigated together with an employee from
Knowit. This included all steps from making the hard drive copy to writing the
report. The investigation is further presented in Chapter 4.
2.4 Conclusion
Concluding this chapter, literature with primary sources from the European Union
Commerce, Swedish laws and widely known and established frameworks on infor-
mation security such as the ISO and NIST frameworks have been used. As the
second source of information, in this paper called empirics, open ended inter-
views have been conducted with security consultants and one CISO as well as one
performed forensic investigation. A qualitative and iterative approach has been
chosen as the most suitable tools/methods for investigating the proposed problem
statement.
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Chapter3
Theory
In this chapter the theoretical literature studies are presented. Relevant concepts
are deﬁned and explained together with legal terms. Each section covers a new
term or theme that will be of relevance for the result and discussion. Firstly
GDPR will be examined in general, the speciﬁc articles of importance, additional
laws followed by incident management, common attacks and recent intrusions.
3.1 GDPR
The GDPR will apply from 25 May 2018 when PUL, the current Swedish privacy
protection law, will be abolished. GDPR was adopted by the European Parliament
and will be directly applicable in every EU Member State and carries considerably
tougher sanctions than current legislation. If processing of personal data is not
done in accordance with the legal framework, a ﬁne of up to 4% of a company’s
global annual sales, or 20 million Euro, depending on the higher one, may be
applicable. Any company working with information relating to EU citizens will
have to comply with the requirements. The regulation consists of 99 articles and
173 recitals. The recitals are underlying reasons that the articles are built upon.
Each article is linked to on one or more recitals [7].
The regulation aims to protect fundamental rights and freedoms of natural
persons, and in particular the right to protection of personal data. Several areas
are covered by the GDPR, but all with the core in PII, as illustrated in Figure 2.
Such as the right to be erased and forgotten, and also the right to request data
portability and clear consent for processing personal data. GDPR also restricts
companies and organizations from storing personal data for longer time than nec-
essary, prohibiting storage of data that is not relevant for the business and enforce
penalties if not done accordingly [8]. Article 83 expresses that the competent
supervisory authority will make an assessment “in each individual case” when de-
ciding whether to impose an administrative ﬁne [9]. Data breach notiﬁcation,
enforced in Article 33 (Appendix B), is the part of the regulation which will be
the focus of this paper.
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Figure 2 The scope and focus of GDPR, with emphasize on Personal Data as a
central part and Data Breach Notiﬁcation as the focus of this thesis.
In accordance with GDPR, a breach must be communicated to the supervisory
authority within 72 hours after having become aware of the breach, and aﬀected
individuals have to be notiﬁed if the severity so requires. The ﬁrst paragraph of
Article 33 states the following:
"In the case of a personal data breach, the controller shall without
undue delay and, where feasible, not later than 72 hours after having
become aware of it, notify the personal data breach to the supervisory
authority competent in accordance with Article 55, unless the personal
data breach is unlikely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of
natural persons. Where the notiﬁcation to the supervisory authority
is not made within 72 hours, it shall be accompanied by reasons for
the delay." [10]
An additional article of relevance is Article 34, please see Appendix C for
the entire article. This article describes when the personal data beach has to be
communicated to the data subject. Its ﬁrst paragraph requires the controller to
communicate the breach to the data subject without undue delay, cited as:
"When the personal data breach is likely to result in a high risk to
the rights and freedoms of natural persons, the controller shall com-
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municate the personal data breach to the data subject without undue
delay." [11]
Paragraph 3 on the other hand announces that communication to the data subject
should not be required if it would involve disproportionate amount of eﬀort or if
the breached data was encrypted or unintelligible. Article 34, relative Article 33,
requires the risk to be "high" for triggering the communication to data subjects
in contrast to communicating to the supervisory authority where the risk does not
need to be "high", just being a risk. This means that each degree of risk triggers
diﬀerent escalation points and subsequent obligations. Recital 86, Appendix D
gives further information on this.
To be able to minimize risks to data subjects the GDPR requires, in Article
35, data controllers to conduct Data Privacy Impact Assessments, DPIAs, where
infringement of subjects privacy is high.
"Where a type of processing in particular using new technologies, and
taking into account the nature, scope, context and purposes of the
processing, is likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of
natural persons, the controller shall, prior to the processing, carry out
an assessment of the impact of the envisaged processing operations on
the protection of personal data. A single assessment may address a set
of similar processing operations that present similar high risks."[12]
The DPIA is to be performed prior to collection and processing and assess the
potential risk that could result from a breach. DPIA is enforced to mitigate a
breach and create awareness.
To conclude, breach notiﬁcation requires notiﬁcation to the supervisory au-
thority within 72 hours as well as potential notiﬁcation to aﬀected individuals
depending on severity.
3.1.1 Roles and responsibilities
GDPR calls for the mandatory appointment of speciﬁc roles. These are new for
some organizations, old for others. Three fundamental roles in regard to breach re-
sponse are Data Controller, Data Processor and the Data Protection Oﬃcer. The
deﬁnitions of the terms have not been altered in GDPR, only their responsibilities
and obligations.
Data Controller
A data controller is a key person in breach response. The controller decides
whether or not a breach has reached a trigger point, of subject being at risk,
and an incident needs to be escalated. Escalation involves notiﬁcation to both the
supervisory authority and data subject, if needed. Article 4 deﬁnes the role as:
“ ’Controller’ means the natural or legal person, public authority,
agency or other body which, alone or jointly with others, determines
the purposes and means of the processing of personal data”[13]
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Data Processor
On behalf of the controller, the data processor entity processes data in accordance
with a given framework. The framework, conducted by the controller, deﬁnes
the purpose of processing and how it shall be performed. The processor has to
demonstrate compliance with the given framework, as well as with GDPR. The
processor has obligations to alert the controller of any sign of a breach without
undue delay after having become aware of it. Article 4 deﬁnes the role as:
"’Processor’ means a natural or legal person, public authority, agency
or other body which processes personal data on behalf of the controller”[13]
Data Protection Oﬃcer
The Data Protection Oﬃcer, DPO, is the point of contact for all regulatory over-
sight agencies. Its contact details should be published publicly, be easily accessible
and also be included in the report to the supervisory authority upon a breach. The
DPO could be a controller or processor’s staﬀ member.
3.1.2 Personal information
It is important to diﬀerentiate data processing between personal data and sensitive
personal data, to be able to incorporate adequate security measurements. The
terms have previously not been as broad, but as of article 4 in GDPR, personal
data is considered to be:
"Any information relating to an identiﬁed or identiﬁable natural per-
son (‘data subject’); an identiﬁable natural person is one who can
be identiﬁed, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an
identiﬁer such as a name, an identiﬁcation number, location data, an
online identiﬁer or to one or more factors speciﬁc to the physical,
physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of
that natural person" [13]
This means that by stating “natural person” the scope of GDPR is limited to only
cover PII of people who is alive. However, basically any information that one may
have about someone is considered to be personal data as long as it, in some way, is
possible to identify a natural person from the information. Examples of personal
data may be: name, address, telephone number, identity number, email, photos
but also license number, IP-address and cookies.
3.1.3 Sensitive personal information
Stronger grounds need to exist for processing sensitive data, it is by default pro-
hibited through Article 9. The article deﬁnes sensitive data as:
"Data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious
or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and data concerning
health or sex life." [14]
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PII and sensitive PII is something that GDPR does diﬀerentiate between during
the incident management procedure, as diﬀerent actions are required to be taken
depending on severity [14].
3.2 Breach response
A data breach occurs when a data source successfully gets inﬁltrated and sensitive
data manage to be extracted. Moreover, a personal data breach, according to
Article 4 in GDPR, is considered to be:
“A breach of security leading to the accidental or unlawful destruction,
loss, alteration, unauthorized disclosure of, or access to, personal data
transmitted, stored or otherwise processed” [13]
This, in contrast to a security incident, solely focuses on data breaches concerning
personal data. A data breach can be categorized into the security principles deﬁned
by the CIA triad, Conﬁdentiality, Integrity and Availability (explained in Section
3.6) depending on whether it regards a disclosure, loss of access/alteration or
stolen personal data. A personal data breach sums up to be any kind of unwanted
procedure performed on personal data.
Breach response is about preventing, reacting and addressing a breach, mini-
mizing the damage, identifying the issue and eﬃciently communicating the issue
through breach notiﬁcation procedures. Breach notiﬁcation has to be performed
internally as well as to the general public so that they may take measures to pro-
tect themselves from ﬁnancial fraud, identity theft, or other personal injury [15].
Breach response is part of the greater ﬁeld Incident Management, with the goal
to mitigate violations of security policies.
In GDPR, it is the controller and processor that have the operational respon-
sibility to adopt suitable measures for breach response. WP29 has distributed
recommendations on four practical steps:
• "Information concerning all security-related events should be directed to-
wards a responsible person or persons with the task of addressing incidents,
establishing the existence of a breach and assessing risk."
• "Risk to individuals as a result of a breach should then be assessed (likelihood
of no risk, risk or high risk), with relevant sections of the organization being
informed."
• "Notiﬁcation to the supervisory authority, and potentially communication of
the breach to the aﬀected individuals should be made, if required."
• "At the same time, the controller should act to contain and recover the
breach." [16]
3.3 Incident management
The National Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST, (explained in Section
3.6.5) addresses incidents in their "Computer security incident handling guide" as:
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“Violation or imminent threat of violation of computer security poli-
cies, acceptable use policies, or standard security practices.”[17]
Incident management is the process of handling an incident accurately, covering
logging, recording and resolving incidents. Eﬀective incident response management
is handled in several steps or phases. SANS Institute has established six steps
that have been widely used. NIST agrees to the approach of SANS with the
slight change of naming step two detection instead of identiﬁcation. However, the
purpose with these are to respond systematically to incidents:
1. Preparation: Gather and learn the necessary tools, become familiar with
your environment.
2. Identiﬁcation: Detect the incident, determine its scope, and involve the
appropriate parties.
3. Containment: Contain the incident to minimize its eﬀect on neighboring IT
resources.
4. Eradication: Eliminate compromised artifacts, if necessary, on the path to
recovery.
5. Recovery: Restore the system to normal operations, possibly via reinstall
or backup.
6. Wrap-up: Document the incidents’ details, retain collected data, and discuss
lessons learned. [18]
From these 6 steps, the ones that will be covered in this paper are particularly
points one, two and three, preparation, identiﬁcation and containment. These
include detection, response, mitigation and reporting, which will have to be altered
for compliance with GDPR.
3.4 Computer forensics
Computer forensics is part of the greater discipline of forensics, in which vari-
ous types of evidence are studied to investigate a crime. Computer forensics is
essentially the study of digital data, including data recovery and data tracking.
The goal is to perform a structured investigation while maintaining a documented
chain of evidence of what happened, and obtain the information of why something
managed to occur and who to blame responsible. The procedure may be to ﬁrst
physically isolate the device and make a copy of its storage media. Followed by
forensic softwares and a variety of techniques to examine the copy [19]. Forensic
techniques may be necessary to respond to the requirements of incident reporting
in GDPR due to the very speciﬁc details that are required to be addressed. The
general goal of forensics is to obtain digital evidence to hold someone account-
able while keeping the integrity and conﬁdentiality of the evidence. In regards
to GDPR, it is not necessary to hold someone accountable but rather to identify
what data subjects and objects have been compromised. Further on in this paper
the word ’forensics’ will be used as ’computer forensics’.
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3.5 Information security
Information security has for long had the characteristics of the CIA-triad, as seen
in Figure 3 below, working for conﬁdentiality, integrity and availability.
Figure 3 Illustrates the characteristics of information security as CIA and AAA,
along with the two categories of security measures
Conﬁdentiality covers privacy. Integrity covers maintaining the consistency, accu-
racy and trustworthiness of data. Availability stands for having the data available,
even in situations of incidents. [20] CIA often comes together with AAA, Authen-
tication, Authorization and Accounting, which is used to support the CIA concept
and can directly be connected to the security measures through the Administra-
tive security and Technical security. GDPR enforces information security on PII
through both CIA and AAA. The PII should be accurate and enforce the possibil-
ity to update and request a portable extract of collected data. The PII should not
be accessible for any other party than the organization which collected the con-
sent. The security measures, from Figure 3, will all be of relevance for compliance
with GDPR [21].
3.6 Laws, regulations and standards
Incident response is not new in Sweden, but it has not been enforced to this extent
until now, covering this broad spectrum of organizations and thorough require-
ments. However, there are several laws and regulations overlapping with GDPR
today. Below follows a few directives and standards for information security.
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3.6.1 PUL and MSB - Current instance for incident reporting
The regulation GDPR is, in Sweden, replacing Personuppgiftslagen, PUL. PUL
was based on the previous European Data Protection Directive, DPD, from 1998.
The Swedish Civil Contingency Agency, MSB, is the authority responsible for “is-
sues concerning civil protection, public safety, emergency management and civil
defense”[22]. PUL did not enforce general incidents to be reported. However,
MSB issues regulations for government authorities in the ﬁeld of information secu-
rity. The regulation MSBFS 2016:2 covers it-incident management for government
agencies [23]. From 2016, government agencies were forced to report their security
incidents to comply with the complementary regulation, KBF (Krisberedskaps-
förordningen)2015:1052 and MSBFS 2012:2. In 2016, 214 incidents were reported
to MSB. Before the regulation was initiated, MSB handled only about 40-80 in-
cidents a year [24]. Government agencies have to communicate a breach to MSB
within 24 hours after an incident has been discovered, including the following
parts:
1. Name of concerned government agency
2. A description of the IT-incident including the course of event and measures
taken/to be taken.
3. The exact or estimated hour of the incident
4. Hour of incident discovered and if it is still ongoing.
5. What type of incident, loss of information, attack etc.
6. The government agencies’ initial evaluation of the incidents’ magnitude and
consequences. [24]
If the government agency has made a police report there is no need to report
to MSB.
3.6.2 ISO 27000 family
The International Organization for Standardization, ISO, together with the In-
ternational Electro-technical Commission, IEC, form the specialized system for
worldwide standardization. The Swedish Standards Institute ones stated "Stan-
dards make the world go around." The family of ISO 27000 standards covers
international standards that helps to keep information assets secure[25].
ISO 27001 provides requirements for establishing, implementing, maintaining
and continually improving Information and Security Management System, ISMS.
An ISMS preserves the conﬁdentiality, integrity and availability, CIA, of informa-
tion by applying a systematic approach to managing sensitive company informa-
tion so that it remains secure [26].
3.6.3 NIS
The directive on Security of Network and Information Systems, NIS, focuses on
achieving a high level of network and information system security across the Eu-
ropean Union. It aims to improve cybersecurity capabilities on national level,
Theory 19
increasing cooperation among cybersecurity and EU member states and introduc-
ing security measures and incident reporting obligations [1]. NIS will come into
eﬀect in May 2018, similar to GDPR. EU member states have until then to make
a national interpretation and come up with national laws. The reporting in NIS
is to be done to the national Computer Security Incident Response Team, CSIRT,
which in Sweden is at MSB. MSB is then responsible to further investigate and
announce how this should be done in compliance with NIS. What NIS requires to
be reported is slightly diﬀerent from MSBFS 2016:2. NIS requires the number of
users aﬀected, when it occurred and the geographical extent of the incident. NIS
only applies to incidents that have a signiﬁcant impact on the continuity of an
important service in the society [27].
3.6.4 PCI DSS
Companies accepting payment card transaction from any of Visa Inc, MasterCard,
JCB and American Express have to comply with the Payment Card Industry Data
Security Standard, PCI DSS.
PCI DSS requires certain documentation to be in order and have recommen-
dations on additional documentation that are not a requirement. First of all, as a
recommendation, an inventory of all the assets processing card holder data should
exist. This inventory should consist of the following information:
• Cardholder data location
• Cardholder data components (cardholder name, card number, experience
date, other sensitive data)
• Data format (clear text, encrypted, masked, truncated)
• Data retention
• Security controls in place to protect the data
• Authorized accounts [5]
Moreover, network diagrams with all connections to cardholder data should be
up-to-date, accurate and complete. This would facilitate questions such as how far
an attacker may have been able to inﬁltrate, which cardholder data repositories
have been exposed or compromised, if cardholder data was protected (encrypted
etc.) at rest and in motion as well as the points of entry to the cardholder envi-
ronment.
Anti-virus Audit logs should be in place to understand how attackers were able
to breach the cardholder data environment. They would be able to answer whether
the antivirus detected any malware or not. Together with clues on whether the
attackers tried to install spyware, backdoors etc. PCI DSS also recommends having
networks logs, OS logs and application logs to be able to understand the extent
of the incident. To avoid logs being altered or deleted, logs should be exported
from the system where they are generated to a secure server. These should be
available for immediate review for at least three months and then be retained for
the minimum of one year. Furthermore, keeping the logs at one central place and
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for a certain amount of time, it is also necessary to synchronize the clocks of all
system components.
Another important part mentioned in PCI DSS is the importance of media
inventories. In the event of a lost backup tape, it’s critical to have identiﬁed the
media content to be able to know whether the lost tape contained payment card
data or not, if it was readable (not encrypted, hashed etc.), and if so, how many
payment cards that has been aﬀected [5]. PCI DSS compliant crypto algorithms
and standards are based on the NIST recommendations of AES, TDES, RSA and
ECC.
It is important to deﬁne the personal data scope and identify where personal
data should be protected, whether in transit or at rest. It is as important to keep
network diagrams up-to-date and accurate. This since breaches often appears on
systems employees know little about, e.g. systems that store data which employees
did not know to exist.
Each company may have their own requirements. Visa, American Express and
Discovery require to be notiﬁed immediately upon conﬁrming a security breach,
but for MasterCard the time-span is 24 hours. Further on, Visa requires within
three business days from the reported compromise a forensic report to be produced.
MasterCard on the other hand requires to obtain the report within 72 hours, no
matter if it is business days or not. How many cards of respective brands that have
been compromised should be ready to be provided. Moreover, within 10 days, a
list of all the compromised cards should be available [5].
PCI DSS requirements mention the need for daily operational procedures and
that log reviews for all system components should be performed on a daily basis.
There is also a requirement for a formal security awareness program with formal
incident response training. The PCI DSS requirements extend beyond those of
GDPR but introduces technical aspects and breach notiﬁcation requirements that
may assist to comply with and understand the GDPR.
3.6.5 NIST
National Institute of Standards, NIST, is part of the US department of Commerce
and have, among others, a division within Computer Security, CSD, and Infor-
mation Technology Laboratory, ITL. CSD conducts research and development to
provide standards and guidelines in areas such as cryptographic Technology and
Secure Systems and ITL develops test methods, proof of concept implementations
and technical analyses. NIST is responsible for developing information security
standards and guidelines, including minimum requirements for federal information
systems. In SP 800-57 Part 3, ’Recommendation for Key Management’ (updated
Jan 16), recommendations on key algorithms are presented. The approved algo-
rithms for encryption/decryption are the symmetric block cipher algorithms AES
(128 bits and higher) and TDA (triple length keys of 56 bits). For asymmetric
ciphers we have RSA (2048 bits and higher), for key-establishing along with the
Elliptic-Curve-Cryptography, ECC, (256 bits key and higher) for generating digital
signatures [28].
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3.7 Attacks and Intrusions
Identifying the way an incident occurred is one of the key factors for assessing a
breach. An understanding of common attacks is therefore of relevance. A breach
can be performed in a broad variety of ways, below a few common attacks vio-
lating the CIA-triad are listed, either in violation of conﬁdentiality, integrity or
availability.
• Ransomware usually enters the system through downloading a software
program that appears benevolent but carries malicious content. It infects a
target machine and encrypts ﬁles and PII stored on the system. To retrieve
the data, the subject is forced to pay a ransom within a short period of time
[29].
• Phishing is an attack, typically carried out by email, that aims to fool
employees in reveling usernames, passwords and other private information,
by acting as a trustworthy entity. Depending on how broad the target group
is, this attack may be called spear phishing for a speciﬁc target, or whaling
if the focus is to tackle senior executives or high-proﬁle targets [29].
• Network attacks aim to capture information in motion, such as with the
Man-in-the-Middle attack, MITM. This will only be a problem if PII is in
transit and there is a lack of strong encryption.
• Injections such as SQL, NoSQL, and LDAP-injections has been in the top
of OWASP top 10 critical application security risks, for several years and are
still the number one security risk in 2017. Injections occur when unsanitized
data/scripts are sent as part of a command or query to an interpreter [30].
The data can trick the interpreter into accessing a database without proper
authorization and may then extract, e.g., PII.
• Broken Access control is this year in place 5 on OWASP top 10. Identity
Access Management, IAM, is often not properly enforced. Access shall only
be granted if it is relevant for the individuals work. The ﬂaws may be taken
advantage of by attackers to access accounts, sensitive ﬁles or tamper data
[30].
• Insider access takes place when employees or IT admins cause harm or
fraud through insider access. This may for example be common if separation
of duties and the principle of least privilege is not performed, leading to risk
of employees taking advantage of their access [5].
• Social engineering is a term used for bypassing physical security and
tricking/baiting employees into giving an attacker access.
• Human errors could be simple mistakes such as mail sent to wrong party
but also due to lack of knowledge.
3.8 Logs and log storage
This section will explain the importance of logs, present standards, recommenda-
tions and diﬀerent requirements on logging that exists today. Lastly, this section
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brieﬂy goes through two types of log storage.
Logs are collections of log entries, each entry consisting of information related
to a speciﬁc event that has occurred within a system or network. Computer
security log management is the response to the greatly increased number, volume,
and variety of computer security logs [31]. Typically logs record who took an
action, when and where the action was taken and what the action was. One
or more logs create an audit trail which may result as evidence, to hold people
accountable for their actions [29]. General log-types can be seen below:
• Application logs (e.g, web server, database server)
• Security tool logs (e.g., anti-virus, change detection, ﬁrewall, intrusion de-
tection)
• Network traﬃc, Outbound proxy logs
• User application logs
• Server and workstation operating system logs [32]
Requirement 10 in PCI DSS explains the importance of tracking and monitor-
ing logs as:
"Logging mechanisms and the ability to track user activities are criti-
cal in preventing, detecting, or minimizing the impact of a data com-
promise. The presence of logs in all environments allows thorough
tracking, alerting, and analysis when something does go wrong. De-
termining the cause of a compromise is very diﬃcult, if not impossible,
without system activity logs." [33]
PCI DSS has strict requirements on logging and requires in 10.2 [33] all ac-
tivities performed by root to be logged. Also, activities on audit trails should be
observed, to detect tampering. The possibility to identify changes, additions and
deletions can help retrace steps taken by unauthorized personnel. Initialization,
stopping, or pausing has to be logged, creation and deletion of system-level objects,
invalid logical access attempts and all individual user access to card holder data.
They also require at least the following to be recorded for all system components
for each log entry and event according to Section 10.3 in PCI DSS:
• User identiﬁcation
• Type of event
• Date and time
• Success or failure indication
• Origin of event
• Identity or name of aﬀected data, system component, or resource
These details provide suﬃcient information of who, what, where, when and how
something occurred. It is critical to be able to link user access to system com-
ponents accessed, this provides the ability to trace back suspicious activity to a
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speciﬁc user. Since PCI concerns card holder data, the strict log-requirements is
not expected by companies not processing this kind of sensitive data, however, in
regards to GDPR it may be relevant.
Several diﬀerent types of storage exist for storing logs, audit trails and records
of digital events. Sequential drives allow you to store much data for a low price.
One example of this kind is the magnetic tape drive. Unfortunately, it is slow
and lacks ﬂexibility. The tape drive must physically scan through the entire tape
until it reaches the desired location to access data stored in the middle. In the
early 2017, IBM set a new record for magnetic tape storage, with areal recording
density of more than 20 times the areal density used in current state of commercial
tape drives [34]. This put the tape drives back in the game competing with the
signiﬁcantly faster Random Access Storages such as hard disks. Hard disks use
a movable head system that allows you to move directly to any point on the
disk without spinning past all the data stored on previous tracks, which allows
for immediate read and write functionality, though costly [29]. It is a trade-oﬀ
between cost/beneﬁt. Regarding logs, sequential storage may be seen as a uniquely
suited storage since extremely large amounts of data can be stored on relatively
inexpensive media. But, when it needs to be accessed, it might be too slow to
comply with the time-frame of incident reports of GDPR.
3.9 Recent incidents
There have been several recent incidents where personal data has been exposed. A
few are highlighted in this section to demonstrate the importance of information
security and will be used as examples further on in this thesis. Four recent incidents
are listed below.
• An example on questionable incident response is the recent data breach of
Equifax in September 2017. 143 million peoples personal data got compro-
mised. The notiﬁcation to the data subjects was not communicated until a
month later, which would have been valuable time for the subjects to take
subsequent actions.[35]
• The Swedish Transport Agency, Transportstyrelsen, recently had a govern-
ment information security disaster. In 2015 they handed over an IT main-
tenance contract to IBM which contained data on the nations safety. The
consultants were not security classiﬁed due to unclear information classiﬁca-
tion or ignorance. The data breach exposed members of the military’s most
secretive units, police suspects, along with PII of the citizens of Sweden.
• NotPetya and BadRabbit are two ransomware attacks that spread during
the summer and autumn of 2017. They appear to be from the same source
and encrypt the content of computers and require a ransom for it to be
returned. The ransomwares caused serious disruption and chaos at large
ﬁrms in both Europe and in the U.S., including hospitals, shipping and
transport ﬁrms, supermarkets and hotels [36].
• Ashley Madison, a Canadian dating site for married couples wanting to have
an aﬀair, had a data breach in 2015. 37 million user accounts were leaked,
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leading to tragic ends for many couples [37].
Chapter4
Empirics
This chapter will present the empirics consisting of 11 interviews conducted at the
consultant ﬁrm Knowit, together with an additional deeper interview at a ﬁntech
company, as well as a conducted forensic investigation. The main objective has
been to get an understanding of how companies today are working with information
security and current approaches to breach response.
4.1 Interviews
As presented in Section 2.4.1, the interviewed consultants were security and legal
consultants from Knowit, with many years of experience in the ﬁeld. The goal was
to get an understanding of the current situation in the ﬁeld, as well as discuss their
approach to the problem statement together with their understanding of GDPR.
In sum, the interviews expressed a general lack of proper incident management
at organizations. The obtained reason for this was general lack of awareness of
consequences, as a result of a non-existing vision for information security, see
Figure 4.
The interviewed consultants had a wide background of experience such as, set-
ting up the ﬁrst CIRT in Sweden, previous positions at Datainspektionen, GDPR
specialists, Incident Management Consultants and forensic analysts. This broad
spectrum of insights contributed well to the understanding of how companies han-
dle security issues today. The consultants areas of expertise, their experience with
breach response and their views on the problem statement were examined. Many
of the interviewed employees had performed incident-response controls at client
sites which brought concrete examples of common shortages.
Figure 4 illustrates how lack of vision leads to malfunction at the other levels,
in accordance with the interviews. The interviews brought forth the common state
of no appointed strategies, no policies, no rules, no guidelines nor instructions for
employees to adopt on how to proceed. Without guidelines, employees do not
know how to act if an incident occurs.
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Figure 4 Illustrates diﬀerent layers where information security should be
assessed, with vision in the core.
The obtained understanding of common security shortages are:
• No one responsible for information security incidents
• No information on security goals or visions
• General lack of knowledge about information security
• Lack of steering documents
• If steering document exist, it is not followed
• If logs exists, they are not being monitored
• No information classiﬁcation procedure
• No accurate Identity Access Management
• Employees do not know where/how to report
• Governments are not as well prepared as one could expect from previous
requirements
• Incident response requirements diﬀer too much between companies, a general
straightforward procedure to follow does therefore not exist.
Positive insights:
• Companies being PCI DSS compliant have a good foundation
• Common with an in advanced established contact for forensic investigation
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To summarize, engagement from top management in security related questions
is a shortcoming. This has resulted in a general lack of awareness of information
security and its risks throughout organizations. It is common to put all trust in
a forensic analyst when an incident occurs. This understanding has shaped this
thesis in highlighting the focus on getting procedures in place, since a forensic
analyst can not make an investigation if, e.g., there are no logs to analyze.
4.2 Observations at ﬁntech company
Two sessions were set up at a ﬁntech company, with their CISO. Together with
a security consultant from Knowit, existing incident response procedures were
investigated along with recommendations on improvements. Appendix E covers
a number of questions discussed. The questions ranged from current security
measures to future plans.
The ﬁntech company had to comply with both PCI DSS and GDPR, which
made it an interesting company to meet. One security measure was the Disaster
recovery plan, DRP, that each system owner had to read and ﬁll out. The DRP
contained an inventory of what assets and PII that were stored, as the recom-
mendation by PCI DSS in Chapter 3 section 3.7.4. The focus of the plan was to
prepare the company for production disruption. Contacts to relevant people were
written down for each system together with system descriptions, network inter-
faces, critical ﬁles keys, etc. The company also had a Business Continuity Plan to
support management in case of a disaster.
Regarding the question if they will be able to extract the relevant data to report
when an incident occurs, the company put their trust into the forensic analyst. The
company itself did not have the competence in-house. When an incident occurs,
they would call a forensic analyst for the investigation. The company itself focused
on two things. First, to set up an incident response team fast. Second, grant the
forensic analysts access to systems and centralized log archives along with making
information available with contact details to relevant employees, etc.
Having established security policies are the ﬁrst step towards a well-performed
incident response. During the second session, elaboration on their incident re-
sponse plan was done. It included steps to set up initial communication tools, in-
volve the right people and actions to take, such as maximizing logging on all units,
increasing log monitoring, disconnecting from network, limiting ﬁrewall rules to
mitigate incidents, replacing crypto keys and ﬁnally conduct a report.
By looking at the observations made at the company, a well-functioning secu-
rity procedure was in place since they already were compliant with PCI DSS.
4.3 Forensic investigation
The aim of the forensic investigation was to get a better understanding of the
forensic procedures and the struggles a forensic analyst faces. The investigated case
was about identifying what had happened and why. The entity of investigation
was a hard-drive from a kiosk-window-terminal. Using a write-blocker, a dd-image
of the hard-drive was taken to be able to analyze without risking altering the real
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disk. The hash algorithm MD5 was used to calculate a checksum to make sure no
changes had been done to the drive following the closing of the disk. Relevant logs
got extracted, such as event-logs, chrome-logs and ﬁle-system-logs. From these
logs, a time-line was created and the search for suspicious actions initiated. A
ﬁnal hypotheses of what had happened managed to be brought forth and a report
was written.
Chapter5
Results
If no personal data is stored, there is no incitement for personal data crime/breach.
Only if data is relevant to an organization’s business should it be stored, kept and
protected. This chapter presents the result of the theoretical literature study
together with the empiric interviews. The chapter is divided into three sections
corresponding to the three subareas earlier presented as:
1. Clariﬁcation of the regulation - What needs to be reported and to whom.
2. Forensic investigation - How to obtain the requested information to be re-
ported. E.g., how can we narrow down the scope of a breach to not assume
all subjects in a database have been leaked.
3. Incident management - Investigate methods and processes in order to pro-
vide best possible environment for forensic analyses.
5.1 Clariﬁcation of GDPR
This section presents the result from mainly the theoretical study. The GDPR
has been thoroughly examined together with observed standards presented in the
theory, NIST, ISO, etc. From these sources the below understanding has been
obtained, presented in three parts:
• Article 33
• When PII can be considered not to be at risk
• When PII might be at risk and what actions then to take.
5.1.1 Article 33
Previously, it used to be enough just acknowledging that a breach had taken place
without any tangible legal requirements for further actions. Moreover, no further
investigations were done due to this being very time-consuming and costly. Now
with the GDPR approaching, procedures for further action needs to be established
and recognized. The main concern for companies today is how to properly under-
stand the regulation and how to make the adequate adoptions. Misleading head-
lines and media information are circulating on sanctions and time-triggers. How-
ever, there are several paragraphs in GDPR which are open for self-interpretation.
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However, mis-interpretations should not be confused as such. What might cause
these misunderstandings is the fact that a requirement in an article of GDPR often
comes with exceptions. These exceptions are not always presented directly after
the requirement itself, enabling for misunderstandings and unjustiﬁed conclusions.
In case of a breach, the supervisory authority to report to in Sweden is Datain-
spektionen. The four parts of what to report are described in Article 33. These
parts are:
1. The nature of the personal data breach, including where possible, the cate-
gories and an approximate number of data subjects concerned together with
the categories and approximate number of personal data records concerned.
2. The name and contact details of the data protection oﬃcer or other contact
point where more information can be obtained.
3. The likely consequences of the personal data breach.
4. The measures taken or proposed to be taken by the controller to address the
personal data breach, including, where appropriate, measures to mitigate its
possible adverse eﬀects.[10]
Point one raises most concern and will be one of the main focus areas in
this report. The approximate number of personal data records together with the
number of data subjects will be analyzed.
Note that the report only has to be conducted unless the personal data breach
is unlikely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of a natural person. To be
able to state whether this is the case or not, the category of the data concerned,
is of interest. If the breach is likely to result in economic or social disadvantages
for the data subject or result in discrimination, identity theft or fraud, then there
is a risk to the rights and freedoms of a natural person. The fact that GDPR
restricts organizations from storing information they do not have a valid reason to
keep is a good reason for companies to ﬁnally get rid of unnecessary data and save
storage-space. To conduct an asset check as PCI DSS recommends and go through
all collected information is a relevant step in order to be aware of what data is
being stored where. It is also a great way to discover data that is not as protected
as it should. Drawing on what was mentioned in the theory, most breaches take
place on systems where data weren’t known to be stored, this is one of the things
GDPR addresses and aims to reduce.
5.1.2 No subject at risk
When an incident occurs, the degree of the incident in terms of whether PII is
at risk, high risk, immediate risk or at no risk, needs to be determined. To be
able to prove the latter, not at risk, the exposed data has to be unintelligible.
GDPR gives encryption as an example to obtain this state but provides no further
details. By looking at PCI DSS, the NIST recommendations are followed and the
encryption is only approved if it is aligned with the recommendations of NIST.
Today this would be AES or TDES. For key management and signatures, RSA
and ECC would be valid. These are referred to as the state of the art algorithms
by NIST. A reasonable approach to adapt for GDPR would be to follow these
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recommendations of NIST. The exposed PII would then not be considered to be
at risk, as long as the key is certain not to have been compromised. A subsequent
question that previously has been discussed by many parties is whether a breach
of unintelligible data still needs to be reported to concerned authority. Working
Party 29, WP29, published an opinion in 2014 where they argued for that a breach
still should be considered a breach even though the data was encrypted with state
of the art algorithms [38]. However, in October 2017 they published a paper on
’Data breach notiﬁcation’ in regards to GDPR, concluding the contrary [16] :
"If personal data have been made essentially unintelligible to unau-
thorized parties and where the data are a copy or a backup exists, a
conﬁdentiality breach involving properly encrypted personal data may
not need to be notiﬁed to the supervisory authority. This is because
such a breach is unlikely to pose a risk to individuals’ rights and free-
doms".
Opposed to their previous statements, this is currently the latest analyze on
the subject. However, they add that circumstances could change and notiﬁcation
be required later on:
"It should be borne in mind that while notiﬁcation may initially not
be required if there is no likely risk to the rights and freedoms of in-
dividuals, this may change over time and the risk would have to be
re-evaluated. For example, if the key is subsequently found to be com-
promised, or a vulnerability in the encryption software is exposed, then
notiﬁcation may still be required."
Moreover, an alternative to encryption would be to prove unintelligible through
other means. If we could, through for example information classiﬁcation and
proper IAM, be able to conclude that the intruder would have managed to gain
an access with a certain level of authority and would with that authority only be
able to view data with classiﬁcation "public". This would be considered a breach
unlikely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons. This step
is important and will be further discussed in sections 5.3 and 5.4, including assess-
ment of what measures that need to be set up on both a physical and structural
level to be able to reach the above conclusion.
This section has explained two paths reaching the conclusion of subjects not
being at risk and no further actions required. These have been (1) if the exposed
data was encrypted with state of the art algorithms and (2) demonstrated other
means of unintelligibly, illustrated in Figure 5.
5.1.3 Subject at risk
If the initial hypothesis did not reach a path leading to a subject not at risk, the
incident should be considered as personal data might be at risk and the procedure
should be followed from there. A forensic investigation would then be necessary to
be able to further specify the degree of the incident and state whether the situation
is a risk, high risk or immediate risk, in accordance with Figure 5. Figure 5 is a
clariﬁcation of what time-spans and procedures that GDPR enforces depending on
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the severity of risk. The deﬁnitions of the diﬀerent degrees of risk are not clearly
deﬁned in GDPR and await further clariﬁcation.
Figure 5 Actions regarding risk to PII. Illustrates the severity level of an incident
and actions to take depending on the level of risk to subjects’ rights and freedoms.
An initial approach to assess the degree of risk is to examine the DPIA where
the risk already has been assessed prior to carrying out the processing operation.
The DPIA is assumed to be written in a more generalized manner and therefore
may not be applicable to the speciﬁc circumstances of an actual breach. However,
the DPIA would point in the right direction for further investigation as a good
starting point. If the risk would be considered ’immediate risk’ to the rights and
freedoms of concerned subject, such as for sensitive PII, the data subject has to
be notiﬁed immediately and the supervisory authority, Datainspektionen, as the
second point to alert. If it instead would be a ’high risk’, the notiﬁcation to
Datainspektionen comes ﬁrst and the second point to alert would, in this scenario,
be the data subject. Note that the data subject does not need to be notiﬁed within
72 hours in this case, but without undue delay as stated in recital 86, see Appendix
D. If the eﬀort to notify all subjects would involve disproportionate eﬀort, a public
communication that informs the aﬀected data subject in similar eﬀective manner
would be feasible. A disproportionate eﬀort could be when the PII does not contain
contact details. It then might exist a possible way to obtain the details, but no
clear procedure of actions. GDPR would then accept the breach to just being
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announced on, e.g., their web page. If the risk would be categorized as only ’risk’,
the data subject does not need to be notiﬁed at all, only Datainspektionen. GDPR
recognizes that 72 hours is a short amount of time and is aware of the risk that
it might not be possible to hand in required and necessary information in time,
paragraph four in Article 33 responses to this as:
“Where, and in so far as, it is not possible to provide the information
at the same time, the information may be provided in phases without
undue further delay”. [10]
Accordingly, GDPR allows for further notiﬁcations in phases. This is likely the
situation for complex breaches with conducted forensic investigations for estab-
lishing the nature of the breach and extent of compromised PII. Many parts of
GDPR turn out not as strict as they ﬁrst appeared. After all, GDPR is not here
to make companies pay sanctions but rather to create awareness on information
security and protect the rights of the individuals. However, where GDPR might
be a heavier burden than previously expected is within the forensic investigation.
To be precise, obtaining the following information:
• The approximate number of data subjects
• The approximate number of data records
• The exact subjects aﬀected
To conclude, the process-scheme in Figure 5 has been developed through dis-
cussions and interpretations. It is a clear guidance of what needs to be done within
what time-span depending on severity of risk.
5.2 Forensic investigation
Incident forensics may be the ﬁrst step of a response strategy with logs among
the richest source of evidence. This section will start to identify how the role of
the forensic analyst will change, followed by an approach for initial hypotheses of
breached data, ﬁnalizing with recommendations on log management. All aiming
to narrow down the suspected amount of data loss and to obtain the summarized
factors from the previous section, the number of data subjects, numbers of data
records and exactly what subjects.
5.2.1 The forensic alteration
What previously mainly appeared in major investigations of crime or the like, now
might be necessary for any general data breach. The work of a forensic analyst will
not only be conducted for evidence in court but also for identifying the severity
level of risk to a subjects’ rights and freedoms. The investigation is recommended
to be performed by accredited individuals to have it properly performed. The
actual forensic work might not change, only its importance and load. It is possible
the work will actually be easier. This since GDPR requires certain procedures to
be in place which will facilitate an investigation, such as relevant logs being stored
and preserved in an optimal manner.
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5.2.2 Intrusion points
The chosen approach, to obtain the requested information to report, has been to
focus on the intrusion points. To ﬁnd out what to act upon and what logs that are
of interest, the possible ways of getting into the system have to be identiﬁed. Each
unique entry point may need a unique setup for containing a breach. However,
some identiﬁed intrusion ways, based on attacks previously mentioned, has here
been categorized into three groups. These are:
• Compromised authentication
• Malicious code
• Capture of data in motion
A compromised entry point would be any kind of unauthorized access to a system.
These three has been chosen since the attacks included in each category may use
similar approaches for identifying the compromised data.
Figure 6 An initial approach to forensic investigation that groups diﬀerent types
of threats into groups based on their intrusion point. Each group could then use
similar measures of containment.
The ﬁrst category covers compromised authentication which is the goal of any kind
of attack against credentials or access rights, illustrated in the left path of Figure
6. Among the attacks previously discussed in Section 3.7 that are covered in this
category, are phishing, social engineering and insider threats. Basically, anything
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that would give direct access to data at rest through obtaining someone’s access.
The common factor is that the intruder (insider or outsider) is authorized/falsely-
authorized and granted a certain set of authorization depending on what kind
of IAM that is in use. This authorization is what will contain the compromise
to not suspect all data to be exposed. Some common IAMs are Rule-based ac-
cess management, Role-based access management, Mandatory access management
and Discretionary access management. No matter what IAM that is in use, an
Access List, Access matrix or similar should be in place that would be able to
identify a certain user/employees authorities. To give an example, let’s say we
have identiﬁed, through proprietary data ﬁltering, that the user Alice has been
leaking secret data. Whether it truly is Alice or if it is someone that falsely has
been authenticated as Alice we do not know. But what we do know is that all
data Alice is able to access should be considered as potentially compromised data.
If role-based access management is being used we could look at what data-ﬁles the
role of Alice is granted, ﬁles that are classiﬁed as public, conﬁdential and secret,
or even top secret. The classiﬁcation of data is here crucial. Without a proper
data classiﬁcation, it would not be possible to categorize the data and therefore
neither be possible to manage a proper IAM. To limit the impact, the principle
of least privileged should always be in use. This means giving employees the least
possible authorities to perform their duties. If on the other hand, the admin ac-
count would have been compromised through, e.g, an escalation of privilege attack,
unfortunately, all data in the system could need to be seen as leaked.
The second intrusion point has been categorized into covering attacks injecting
malicious code to a system. This category covers a broad range of diﬀerent types
of attacks such as SQL injections, XSS, buﬀer overﬂow, backdoors, virus, trojans
and much more. The category could be sub-divided into the client resp. server-side
since the procedure of containing a breach slightly diﬀer. For servers, the breach
may be isolated to the data stored or processed on that speciﬁc server. To make
sure the malicious code hasn’t spread, a look at the ﬁrewall logs may be of value.
If the system, e.g., only used to get input data but now also carries out output
data, there is a risk of the malicious code spreading to other systems. Checking for
abnormalities would spot this change and likely trace the code to a new location,
in which might have been compromised, the Active Directory, AD, in worst case.
Moreover, on the client side, ﬁrst of all checking what data that is stored on the
client. Secondly, ﬁnd out to what systems the client has access to. By looking at
the ﬁrewall logs, trace of what systems the client has accessed from the time of
the breach, and from there on containing the breach to data in those systems.
Data in motion transmitted over a network can be captured through, e.g., data
network eavesdropping, data tampering or data theft. This is the third category
of intrusion points. The ﬁrst action to take is to identify what network that has
been compromised, such as an external guest network or internal, with ﬁles and
catalogs accessible. Next step would be to identify what systems communicate
over that speciﬁc network. Looking at the ﬁrewall rules we may see what systems
that the network may communicate with, e.g. Sharepoint and through what ports.
Ports such as 443 with https traﬃc would not be at the same risk as un-encrypted
traﬃc through FTP port 21 or http on port 80. All servers that has been accessed
through those may need to be assumed compromised. On the other hand, if the
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data was sent encrypted, that would be enough of a safeguard to no longer assume
that risk. Wireshark could here be a good tool to use for observing network traﬃc.
The three intrusion points that have been examined have demonstrated an
initial way to state what data that has been compromised. Until a forensic in-
vestigation has been performed, just by looking at these attack-paths, it will be
possible to narrow down the scope of subjects being concerned to at least a lit-
tle less. This will be necessary if no forensic analyst will be able to obtain the
information needed in just 72 hours.
5.2.3 Logs and log storage
The fundamental problems with log management are the high number of log
sources and generation of large volume of log data that not only need to be stored
but also monitored. Log management is essential to ensure that computer security
records are stored in suﬃcient detail for an appropriate period of time. Logs are
the core of any forensic data investigation. All attacks discussed in previous sec-
tion results in the need to rely on proper log management to be able to obtain the
requested evidence of an incident. Too selective log management results in no evi-
dence. Too much logs leads to very time-consuming investigations and diﬃculties
in ﬁnding the logs of relevance. GDPR has not yet given any recommendations
nor guidance on what to log. In this section, recommendations have been made
from looking at other laws and regulations mentioned in the theory.
Log-decisions generally will depend on what PII that exist in a system and
none the less, where it is located. After identifying the PII and sensitive data, the
focus should be put on suﬃcient logging for all access to these systems/servers.
Some fundamentals in logging can be summarized as the following:
• Make sure the time-stamp is accurate and synced to a common time source
• Make sure the logs tell you who did what
• Keep the logs read-only to avoid tampering
• Don’t keep sensitive information in the logs
• Do not store useless logs
• Do not log data unless it is legally sanctioned
• Centralize logs
Logs not to be stored would be sensitive personal data and logs that would be
of no help in an investigation. Following the advice of PCI DSS, each log entry
should be compost of type of event, date and time, success or failure indication,
origin of the event, aﬀected data and a user identiﬁcation. A user identiﬁcation
should be able to track a user’s action to one speciﬁc individual which results
in shared accounts being unacceptable. Account Management actions are also of
importance to be logged to be able to see what users that have existed, viewed,
created, updated and deleted.
The next concern to raise is the retention period for logs. If any legal require-
ments apply for the retention those should be prioritized, such as for card data
Results 37
with PCI DSS. As with GDPR, nothing is stated, and logs should therefore only
be retained for as long as necessary. Since it usually takes months to discover
a breach the optimal retention period is hard to deﬁne. PCI DSS has made the
requirement to retain logs for one year and the last three months must be easily
accessible. This is a good feasible approach to adopt in the case of GDPR for
systems storing sensitive PII. Systems with regular PII might argue that one-year
retention policy would constitute to disproportionate eﬀort which is justiﬁed if the
PII would not risk the rights nor freedoms of the subject.
Long-term storage is not meant to be accessible unless an investigation is being
performed. Drawing on the theory in Chapter 3, mechanical disks is a suitable
option regardless of its limitations of being very slow. Whereas the 3-months
storage needs to be accessible and easy searchable which works for centralized log
systems on hard disks. Every year more and more logs will be available to extract,
and even with a retention period of only 3 month the storage will end up expensive
and the dilemma of cost-beneﬁt is confronted. An alternative is to use cloud-based
services, such as SPLUNK. It exist several of diﬀerent cloud-based solutions, but
whether to use a cloud-based or a distinct oﬄine solution is a discussion not taken
in this report. Whatever storage is chosen, all activities on the storage system
need to be tracked to identify abnormalities and also preferable having calculated
hashes for all data sets stored to spot changes.
To establish and maintain a successful log management, an organization should
develop standard procedures and guidelines for performing log management. This
is part of the greater ﬁeld of incident management that will be examined in the
next section.
5.3 Incident management
As incidents no longer is a question of if, but rather when, procedures of how
to respond needs to be deﬁned and adopted. From the empirics, it was clear
that this is where most companies today are lacking. ISO 27001, NIST, SANS
and others have settled guidance and standards of how to perform proper incident
management. This section will stress some important points relevant to the GDPR.
An initial vision of where the company is aiming is essential, as illustrated in
Figure 4 in Chapter 4. Top management needs to address the organizations vision
in information security and demonstrate through steering documents and policies
how this should be enforced. There needs to be a strategy in place, policies es-
tablished, rules to follow and guidelines of how to do so. Not until then will it
be possible for each and every employee to have a chance to act accurately upon
an incident. A good step forward would be to establish an Information Security
Management System, ISMS, in Sweden called LIS (Ledningsystem för Information-
ssäkerhet). ISO 27001 is a speciﬁcation on creating an ISMS as part of an organi-
zation’s general management systems. ISMS is a set of policies and procedures for
systematically addressing and managing an organization’s sensitive information.
The goal is to limit the impact of a breach by minimizing risks and ensure business
continuity. This consist of identifying system owners, processes and action plans
for incidents. Support documents for this exist at www.informationssakerhet.se in
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which well explains these procedures.
Figure 7 Illustrates two levels of security measures categorizing Foundation as
procedures that should be in place and Action as actions to take when the
incident occurs.
Looking at Figure 7, a well-functional incident management consists of the two
parts, the in advance established foundation and the actions to take once the
incident has occurred. As important as having guidelines to follow, each and every
employee has to be aware of it. Awareness is crucial and it shall be managements
responsibility to make the security guidelines reach out to the employees. Trainings
are a great tool to get employees evolve in security questions. Awareness could
also cover the organization’s awareness of potential risks. Risk assessments are
the tool for this. The GDPR requires data controllers to conduct Data Privacy
Impact Assessments, DPIA, where privacy breach risks are high, to minimize risks
to data subjects. DPIA is a type of Risk assessment but focuses only on PII and
not the overall risks for the company.
Moreover, what needs to be in order prior to an incident is information clas-
siﬁcation. In order to be able to prioritize and calculate on risks, the processed
information needs to be labeled. Common sensitivity classiﬁcations for commer-
cial use are public, sensitive, private and conﬁdential. Each category may then
have diﬀerent requirements for processing data, e.g. degree of encryption. Espe-
cially within GDPR this will be of high value in order to quickly be able to state
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whether the exposed data might risk a subjects’ rights and freedoms. Informa-
tion classiﬁcation also enables the use of Data Loss Prevention systems to prevent
sensitive-labeled data leaving the organization.
IAM is also part of the technical security that needs to be properly set up. For
best use, it is important to follow the ’need-to-know-principle’ and the ’principal of
least privilege’ in order to grant employees the lowest level of access possible. This
will especially be of importance considering the ﬁrst intrusion point mentioned
in the previous section, compromised authentication, to minimize the access for
possible intruders.
Log management is the ﬁnal crucial foundation that needs to be in place
prior to an incident. An organization should deﬁne logging requirements and then
develop policies that clearly deﬁne mandatory requirements and suggested recom-
mendations for log management activities, including log generation, transmission,
storage, and analysis. It lays in the hands of the organization’s management to
provide necessary support to develop these processes. The operational processes
of log management should include monitoring and detection. Anomalies should be
detected and investigated. IDS softwares exist for this cause and should be used.
This foundation is not a very common engagement at organizations today.
However, its importance is getting more and more attention, thanks to recent
incidents that likely could have been avoided with the right support from top
management. Some companies entirely rely on an external forensic analyst when
incidents occur, and take no actions however before nor after. Even if a forensic
analyst will be called in whether there is a process for it or not, the breach will
most likely be much better contained if there is one. The preparations are done
not only to give the forensic investigator the best feasible starting-point to per-
form an investigation but also to be able to handle the entire procedure that an
incident puts one in, from identifying the incident in time to know who to call and
communicate with.
The right part of Figure 7 address suitable measures to be taken upon a breach.
GDPR enforce information concerning all security-related events to be directed to-
wards the controller. It is the controller’s obligation to gather the incident response
team, and forensic analyst if necessary. The controller shall classify the incident
based on risks to individuals, involving relevant sections of the organization. De-
pending on the degree of severity, notiﬁcation to the supervisory authority and,
if necessary, to aﬀected individuals are performed. The controller triggers the in-
cident response plan working for containment and recovery. An entire Incident
management plan is more complex than this, but in regards to GDPR, the steps
mentioned above is the ones that should be in focus to be able to identify and
contain a breach.
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Chapter6
Discussion
This chapter will discuss some aspects of breach notiﬁcation within GDPR based
on the result.
6.1 Engagement from top-management
Whether top management sees their engagement in security-related topics as justi-
ﬁed may be a concern. GDPR is just one among many legal frameworks companies
need to comply with. But as GDPR has gotten signiﬁcant attention in media, the
common public has become aware of it and realized the value for themselves of
choosing companies well-compliant with the regulation. In addition to being a
legal framework to comply with, GDPR has raised the awareness and thereby the
acceptance of breach tolerance. Being the victim of a breach could result in a
devastating loss. If a breach is not handled properly by a company, it may face
customer’s and client’s loss of trust and transfers to competitors. On top of this
reputational loss, the grand sanctions apply.
As full compliance with the regulation by May 2018 will be rare, companies
having the muscles to race and shine at the head of compliance have made a tactical
business move. Credibility will be demonstrated not only through audit, but from
the publics choice of decisions. Concluding, when GDPR becomes a question of
competition, top-management may actually see the value and engage.
6.2 How private is private data?
PII is the core of GDPR. Since notiﬁcation to Datainspektionen only has to be
communicated if the exposed PII would conﬂict a person’s rights and freedoms,
one thing that would be relevant to look further into is the value of PII. What
information would actually conﬂict a person’s rights and freedoms and how the
severity of risk is assessed? We use social media to go public with things we do,
things we have done, our thoughts and habits. If this same information were to be
provided from another source than ourselves, would my rights then be violated?
If we were to map all public data that we have posted, with what is categorized
as being private data, there sure would be plenty of correlations. Someone may
share their religion on their facebook-proﬁle. But as religion is being categorized
as sensitive PII, companies have to do everything they possibly can to protect this
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information. The eﬀort may be seen as disproportionate. However, where we face
the problem, companies do not know whether the subject would not mind sharing
their religion in public or not, which ends up in the need to treat all subjects the
same.
In the case with the Ashley Madison breach, where all their members having
an aﬀair were leaked, the PII itself was not what worried people but the association
of the PII and the site. Simply the fact that they were members of the site. If a
grocery store’s member database would leak, the consequences would not be nearly
as bad. This complicates general guidance on what PII that cause what degree
of risk. It will always depend on the situation, which supports Datainspektionens
approach to make an assessment in each individual case. Aggregation is another
aspect adding complications. The exposed information solely in its current context
might not be of risk, but if this data would be possible to connect to other data of
no risk, sensitive information could appear. Suppose the only PII Ashley Madison
would store would be an email address, if this email would not directly be associable
to a person due to its meaningless name, the subject might feel safe. But what if
the grocery store stored both email and name. That name would then be possible
to connect with Ashley Madison. This demonstrates the need for treating all data
collections with much care and always assuming the worst.
6.3 The impact of GDPR
The GDPR has been criticized heavily, some say it is impossible to be compliant
while other talk about it as "if it happens", hoping it will never come into eﬀect.
Many interpretations have also been made. Media like to amplify the critical parts
but, not often the full picture. The new rules are certainly stricter and more de-
manding for organizations than current rules. However, some rules that seem new
already exist today and most of the requirements of GDPR have exceptions with
notably easier obligations which, as long as attempts of eﬀort can be demonstrated,
instead may be adopted.
6.3.1 Reporting
The initial details to report only cover an approximation of what subjects and
objects that are concerned, which could be possible to obtain through the approach
of point-of-intrusion in the second part of the result. However, when it comes to
notifying concerned individuals it is getting more complex. There will always be
a trade-oﬀ on what and when to report. Historically, organizations have been
very reluctant to reveal their breaches since it would result in loss of trust and
customer conﬁdence. Today with sanctions applied, reporting is even less in favor
to an organization. Organizations may resemble this to raising their hand on
the highway announcing that they are driving too fast and would like to have a
speeding-ticket. Some may argue that, the less detected the better, fostering weak
detection systems and less being reported. However, absence of evidence is not
evidence of absence. If not reported, the sanctions will be even higher and subjects
might be at risks. Since breaches are becoming unavoidable and information that
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is kept might actually cause damage and personally detrimental impact if leaked.
It is necessary to detect the breach before the entire business is put in danger.
6.3.2 Data erasure
The requirement of the possibility for subjects to request to be erased, may be
seen as a problem for incident management. Will subjects, for example, need to
be deleted in backups and logs as well? There is today no certain rule for this,
just thoughts and guesses can be applied. As PII is not supposed to be stored in
logs, this should not be a problem. If PII, however, is stored in logs and a subject
would request to be deleted, this would lead to logs being changed and altered.
This would result in the logs not being valid as evidence any longer since it has
been changed. This would therefore not be a reasonable solution. To remove
a subject from a database backup would not be worse than some extra eﬀorts,
but if the person would need to be erased from not only structured data such as
databases but also from unstructured data, it would add complexity. GDPR has
not yet made any exception for unstructured data. Additionally, some information
is not allowed to be erased due to other laws or regulations that weigh heavier,
leading to the next hurdle, to keep track of what is ok to delete and what is not.
The degree of erasure can also be discussed, since a deleted ﬁle is not really gone.
Is it enough to just remove the pointer to an object, as when deleting a ﬁle, even
if it might be obtainable through an investigation. Will it need to be overwritten,
cleared or even purged? Since this seems as disproportionate amount of eﬀort to
attempt on speciﬁc records, in the case of a subject requesting to be deleted, it is
not a very likely approach.
6.3.3 Time aspects
Several parts of the regulation raise questions on how the articles should be inter-
preted. Article 33 state that "Without undue delay" no later than 72 hours after
“having become aware” of the incident one shall notify the breach to supervisory
authority [10]. First of all, how long time is undue delay? Secondly, when does the
timer start on "having become aware", is it when someone ﬁrst raises the question
of that something might be wrong, or when the controller gets the ﬁnal message
that a breach has taken place. WP29 considers that a “controller should be re-
garded as having become aware when that controller has a reasonable degree of
certainty that a security incident has occurred that has led to personal data being
compromised” [16]. Which does make sense but still enables room for discussion.
In some cases, it will be clear that a breach has taken place whereas in other, the
emphasis should rather be on the action of investigating whether it is, a personal
data breach or just a breach.
6.4 Breaches
A breach can be ugly and if not prepared for, unfounded demands and internal
accusations to IT staﬀ may emerge. Breach responses have for long been the
responsibility of IT. Now, when breaches daily are being seen in newspapers, and
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privacy is becoming a demand from the public, trust and reputation easily get
inﬁltrated by breaches. A well-managed breach response could save a company
from losing both their customers trust and money.
The process of breach response requires combined eﬀorts of IT, legal, com-
munications, operations, and PR, and all need to keep good communication to
act uniformly to mitigate rumors and negative reactionary behaviors. GDPR an-
nounces the obligation on the processor to alert its controller of potential breaches.
The controller has the obligation to act on any alert, justiﬁed or not, to determine
whether a breach has occurred. Since these roles are new for some organizations,
extra enforcement needs to be on integrating these in existing processes and doc-
uments. It is then up to the controller to assess whether the breach triggers a
breach response plan and needs to be escalated.
The incident response will need both the technical and administrative security
measures to be in place. The processor and controller need both accurate prepa-
rations and a plan of immediate actions. People, technology as well as processes
need to be improved and adapted. Awareness throughout the company to report
upward, is an essential element to detect and address a breach and shall not solely
be left to the processor.
Chapter7
Conclusion
Based on obtained results and analysis, this chapter presents the conclusion of
the problem statement How forensic methods and preventive measures must be
adapted to handle the new requirements of breach response in GDPR. The con-
clusion is dived into three subareas that were found to be relevant for identiﬁed
challenges. These are (1) Clariﬁcation and an accurate understanding of GDPR,
(2) Obligations of the forensic investigation, and (3) Incident management.
1. Clariﬁcation of the regulation - What needs to be reported, when and to
whom: The regulation is not as strict as media normally describes it, at
least not in regards to breach notiﬁcation. The foundation of compliance
in breach response consist of having a clear understanding of the regulation
articulated, what and when to report. Whether notiﬁcation shall be done to
Datainspektionen or also to aﬀected individuals. Figure 5 in Section 5.1.3, a
scheme of the process of reporting illustrates the measures to take depend-
ing on what PII that might be at risk and its severity. Exposed Sensitive
PII would lead to controller’s immediate report to concerned individuals
and thereafter to Datainspektionen, all within 72 hours. However, if the
condition of 72 hours is not possible to meet and a valid reason and eﬀort
can be demonstrated, GDPR allows for notiﬁcation in phases. Moreover, if
the PII not would be sensitive PII, the opposite order of reporting should be
performed, starting with Datainspektionen followed by the subjects. Only
incidents that might risk an individuals rights and freedoms have to be no-
tiﬁed, e.g. state of the art encryption alleviate this risk regardless of data
concerned. The trigger points and an understanding of how to accurately
classify an incident in order to take appropriate measures are of relevance.
2. Forensic investigation - How to obtain the requested information to be re-
ported. E.g. how can we narrow down the scope of a breach to not assume
all subjects in a database have been leaked: To obtain the requested infor-
mation to report, and narrow down the scope of a breach to not assume all
subjects in a database have been leaked, a relevant measure is to quickly
involve the controller and competent people. The initial decision can then
be made, if a further investigation is necessary or if it is possible to state
that the potentially exposed data is not at risk.
It is not an easy task to quantify what subjects and objects that have been
compromised. What GDPR requires compared to previous regulation is
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simply that this assessment has to be done. The approach taken in this thesis
was to identify the intrusion point and from there make an initial hypothesis
of the scope of the breach, as described in Figure 6 in Section 5.2.2. Whether
the intrusion point is a compromised authentication, malicious code or data
in motion, diﬀerent measures exist to contain and limit the scope of the
breach, using log management as the fundamental tool. This approach
could be of interest for making the initial decision of the severity of the risk
and also as a tool when the time is too short for a complete and thorough
investigation.
3. Incident management - Investigate methods and processes in order to provide
best possible environment for forensic analyses: To facilitate a potential in-
vestigation there are recommended procedures within incident management
that should be followed. As concluded from the result, the primary step
to take in order to enable compliance with GDPR is to have a clear vision
concerning information security and incident management. This will be nec-
essary to properly manage the needed and required procedures in GDPR.
Vision and security strategy should come from top management rather than
from the IT department to eﬀectively be integrated throughout the com-
pany. Whether the incident response is handled in-house or by an outside
specialist, there should be a clear process of what to do and who to involve,
processor, controller, specialists, etc.
Best possible environment for forensic analyses consists of an established
contact that quickly will be able to grant the analyst access to relevant log
systems and provide further contacts. Clear roles and responsibilities are
crucial. An updated asset inventory is of value to determine what data ﬁles
are on what systems and a search-able log environment containing suﬃcient
logs. This should enable a great starting point for the analyst to deﬁne
exposed data and state the severity of risk.
To conclude, GDPR is implemented by resolutions primarily to reinforce indi-
viduals’ rights of their own data, and not to ﬁnd ﬂaws and issue sanctions. Breach
response in compliance with GDPR consists of having a clear understanding of
what and when to report as well as having an initial approach to obtaining the
exact number of aﬀected individuals. Finally, to have a vision and strategy from
the top of the company so that resources, the right people and a budget, can
enable procedures for an investigation. Essential preventive measures that need
to be in place to be GDPR compliant are primarily awareness and a response
plan. Management, security professionals as well as employees need to be aware of
common attack methods, they need to be aware of what PII they are processing,
and what degree of data conﬁdential classiﬁcation they have in their applications.
This is of relevance in order to take proactive steps, recognizing intrusions when
they occur and respond accordingly. To protectively identify what data is being
stored, where it is located and how it is being transmitted, is crucial. Also deﬁned
data/asset owners are essential. With this information, documented risk analysis
can be made, vulnerabilities and threats evaluated, simulations made and a lo-
calized customization of response plan can be established. With these measures
in place, the time to determine if PII is at risk in a given situation, and breach
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notiﬁcation a requirement, will signiﬁcantly be reduced. To be GDPR compli-
ant its also necessary to have assigned roles of controller, processor and DPO to
take the operative responsibility and provide relevant response plans. Policies and
guidelines need to be updated and in accordance with these new responsibilities.
The recent revelations of companies and government agencies being victims of
data breaches have shed a light on the importance of proper information security.
Not being compliant with GDPR will bring consequences, not only through legal
aspects but also ﬁnancial, process and reputational impact. Being GDPR com-
pliant will in the future be of crucial importance for company reputation. Those
companies who are GDPR-compliant will have a competitive advantage when cus-
tomers select future business partners.
7.1 Summary
This thesis has been developed through a thorough examination of diﬀerent laws,
regulations, frameworks and standards. Interviews, forensic investigation and a
session at a ﬁntech company have been used as the main sources of knowledge.
The obtained conclusions can be summarized as (1) a ﬂowchart of obligations and
requirements on breach notiﬁcation depending on the severity of risk of the breach.
Figure 5 in Section 5.1.3. (2) a ﬂowchart grouping diﬀerent kind of breaches into
groups based on intrusion points. Figure 6 in Section 5.2.2. Each intrusion point
could use similar measures to contain the breach, to make the initial approxi-
mation of what data that is exposed. (3) the importance of engagement from
top-management. To have a vision and strategy in place for information security.
This, to be able to establish the diﬀerent processes and preventive measures that
are of relevance for giving the forensic analyst the best possible starting point.
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Chapter8
Future work
• Datainspektionen recently got new demands, changing name to Integritetssky-
ddsmyndigheten, and adding more support for the GDPR. The authority’s
mission will be changed so that its supportive and advisory role becomes
clearer. This is of interest to follow up on, to see what eﬀect it will have,
stricter requirements or more helpful support.
• What has not been covered in this thesis is an evaluation of diﬀerent tools
currently available for log management, IDS, IPS and SIEM systems. These
would assist in determining what data may have actually been exposed. This
would need a deeper investigation and evaluation for future work.
• An in depth best practice on incident management in compliance with
GDPR would be interesting for future work, not zooming in on breach no-
tiﬁcation but rather focusing on the entire process of incident management.
• Another interesting point for future work is looking at existing laws and aim
for a mapping over correlations and conﬂicts to determine what laws that
weight heavier for certain governments and organizations.
• A deeper investigation in log storage could be of relevance to determine an
optimal recommendation comparing diﬀerent cloud solutions with physical
solutions.
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AppendixA
GDPR Article 4 – Deﬁnitions
This section is directly copied from the relevant deﬁnitions of Article 4 in GDPR.
For the purposes of this Regulation:
• 1. ‘personal data’ means any information relating to an identiﬁed or iden-
tiﬁable natural person (‘data subject’); an identiﬁable natural person is one
who can be identiﬁed, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an
identiﬁer such as a name, an identiﬁcation number, location data, an on-
line identiﬁer or to one or more factors speciﬁc to the physical, physiological,
genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person;
• 2. ‘processing’ means any operation or set of operations which is per-
formed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by
automated means, such as collection, recording, organisation, structuring,
storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by
transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or
combination, restriction, erasure or destruction;
• 7. ‘controller’ means the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or
other body which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and
means of the processing of personal data; where the purposes and means of
such processing are determined by Union or Member State law, the controller
or the speciﬁc criteria for its nomination may be provided for by Union or
Member State law;
• 8.‘processor’ means a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or
other body which processes personal data on behalf of the controller;
• 11. ‘consent’ of the data subject means any freely given, speciﬁc, informed
and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s wishes by which he or she,
by a statement or by a clear aﬃrmative action, signiﬁes agreement to the
processing of personal data relating to him or her;
• 12.‘personal data breach’ means a breach of security leading to the acciden-
tal or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorised disclosure of, or
access to, personal data transmitted, stored or otherwise processed;
• 22. ‘supervisory authority’ means an independent public authority which is
established by a Member State pursuant to Article 51;
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GDPR Article 33
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AppendixE
Questions for qualitative interview
Questions discussed at ﬁntech company:
• What processes do you have for incident response today?
• Have you identiﬁed what systems containing personal data?
• Inventory of assets?
• Internal data or outsourced data, cloudbased?
• How many has access to the personal data? (principle of least privileged)
• What personal data do you have?
• Is there a corporate policy in place for managing logs? (how the logs are
captured, stored, analyzed)
• Is there a deﬁned retention policy for logs over the organization?
• Are logs being stored centrally?
• If not, how are they stored?
• Do you have an Incident manager, security incident manager?
• Are there backups of logs?
• Are the logs encrypted?
• Is any personal data being stored in the logs?
• Is data encrypted at rest resp in motion?
• What intrusion detection systems are being used?
• Do you use Data Loss Prevention?
• What is being logged? (server workstation operating logs, applications logs,
security tool logs, outbound proxy logs)
• Have the employees been doing any security training?
• If a data breach would occur today, what would you do?
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